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ABSTRACT We consider the likely revenue effect of an increase in the cigarette excise tax rate
in West Virginia. We begin with a consideration of the existing literature on how US state
cigarette excise tax policy affects cigarette consumption and cross-border cigarette shopping.
Second, we examine 80 cigarette excise tax increases that have occurred in the US since 2000.
There we find a wide range of responses, but declines in cigarette purchases associated with
any increase in the state cigarette excise tax rate typically fall within a range of 10 to 30
percent.
We close with the estimation of a full regression model that explains cigarette purchases as a
function of the state cigarette excise tax rate, which controls for relevant factors in order to
isolate the specific effect of state tax policy, abstracting from federal cigarette excise tax policy
and the broader decline in smoking in the nation. We use data from the 48 contiguous US
states for the years 2000 through 2014.
The actual number of cigarette packs purchased in West Virginia in FY 2015 was approximately
173 million. The results from our full model indicate that, with a $1 increase in the cigarette
excise tax rate, West Virginia would be expected to collect an additional $101 million in
cigarette excise tax revenue under our most pessimistic scenario, or $134 million under our
most likely scenario. This $134 million estimate reflects an anticipated 14 percent decline in
cigarette purchases attributable to the higher tax rate, to around 148 million packs purchased
annually.
Because the cigarette tax is levied at the wholesale level, we must also consider the net effect
of this change on the consumer sales tax. Netting the effects of reduced pack sales against the
higher retail cigarette prices resulting from the excise tax increase indicates a modest increase
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in consumer sales tax revenue as well, producing overall tax revenue growth of $135 million
under our most likely scenario.
We also considered a $0.45 increase in the cigarette excise tax rate. Here we estimate that
cigarette purchases will decline between 6 and 12 percent and that the overall revenue gain
will fall between $60 and $69 million.
We also include information for policymakers on e-cigarette and other tobacco products (OTP)
tax policy in other states as well as previous economic research conducted to examine the
responsiveness of these products to price changes. Finally, we provide suggestions for
introducing a tax on e-cigarette products and an increase in tax rates for OTP.
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1. Introduction
To help lessen the depth of continued budget shortfalls in West Virginia, state policymakers are
considering the efficacy of raising cigarette and other tobacco product (OTP) excise tax rates. In this
brief report we estimate how much additional excise tax revenue will be generated following an
increase in cigarette and OTP excise tax rates. We consider the existing literature on the revenue effects
of cigarette and OTP excise tax rates and ultimately estimate a pair of statistical models to explain the
likely revenue effects of a $1 per pack increase in the cigarette excise tax rate in West Virginia.
CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION ACROSS STATES Consider Figure 1, in which we report overall cigarette
purchases per capita by state for 2014. West Virginia reported the highest number of cigarette
purchases among the 50 states at 97 packs per person. West Virginia’s cigarette purchases figure is
more than double the national average of 47 packs per person.

Figure 1: Cigarette Purchases per Person, 2014

NEIGHBORING CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX RATES The way in which changes in cigarette excise tax rates
affect cigarette purchases in a state is multifaceted. First, unsurprisingly, individuals typically alter their
cigarette consumption in response to tax-induced price changes. Second, it is almost certain that crossborder shopping behavior responds to changes in tax policy. Consider, Figure 2, which reports the
current cigarette excise tax rates for West Virginia and its bordering states. It is likely that West Virginia
has benefitted from residents from Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Maryland coming into West Virginia to
purchase cigarettes given the state’s lower cigarette excise tax rate. West Virginia has perhaps also lost
some cigarette purchases to Virginia in a similar way, although the tax differential is relatively small. If
West Virginia’s cigarette excise tax were increased to $1.55 from $0.55, these cross-state purchases
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from West Virginia’s northern neighbors could cease and more West Virginians would have some
incentive to travel to Virginia or Kentucky to purchase cigarettes.

Figure 2: Cigarette Excise Tax Rates, West Virginia and Neighboring States

DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS In addition to changes in consumption patterns, the distributional effects
associated with increases in cigarette and OTP tax rates also merit some attention. For example, the
Centers for Disease Control2 finds that adults with incomes below the official federal poverty line smoke
at a rate of 29.2 percent, nearly 13 percentage points greater than those at or above the poverty level.
As a result, given that adults in West Virginia smoke at demonstrably higher rates (27.3 percent)
compared to the national average3 (17.8 percent) and are also somewhat more likely to earn incomes
below the official poverty line, increases in tobacco and OTP tax rates would tend to have larger
distributional impacts in the state.
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2. Existing Literature on U.S. State Cigarette Excise Taxation
OVERALL EFFECT OF CIGARETTE EXCISE TAXES ON CIGARETTE PURCHASES Goel and Nelson (2012) use
a sophisticated econometric approach to examine cigarette purchases in US states as a function of
cigarette prices and a host of other appropriate control factors.4 They estimate that the price elasticity
of demand for cigarette purchases is approximately -0.4 over their entire dataset which spans the years
1956 through 2008, meaning that a 10 percent rise in cigarette prices in a given state leads to a 4
percent drop in cigarette purchases in that state. The authors also assert that this estimate is very much
in line with the previous literature, citing several earlier studies. However, when restricting their study
to more recent data, Goel and Nelson find a much higher elasticity: -0.9 when the dataset includes only
the years 1990 through 2008 and -1.2 when the dataset is restricted to the years 2000 through 2008.

Figure 3: Relationship between Cigarette Excise Tax Rates and Per Capita Cigarette Purchases

WEST VIRGINIA-SPECIFIC ESTIMATES In addition to their primary analysis that considers all 50 states,
Goel and Nelson (2012) also conduct separate analysis using time series data specific to each state. The
elasticity estimates discussed in the previous paragraph represent average effects across all US states,
and it is reasonable to expect that behavioral patterns vary across states, given differences in cultural
preferences toward cigarette consumption and given differences in cross-border shopping
opportunities. In the portion of their analysis that is specific to West Virginia, the authors estimate an
elasticity of cigarette purchases with respect to cigarette prices of -0.1, compared to the overall effect of
4
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-0.4. While this state-specific analysis is not as statistically reliable as the broader analysis, it does
provide some evidence that West Virginia would exhibit a relatively low behavioral response.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT AFFECT RESPONSIVENESS TO TAXES Other studies that have
examined individual data have found that an individual’s responsiveness to increases in cigarette prices
depend on several factors. For example, Farrelly et al. (2001) find that this responsiveness tends to be
higher for younger smokers, female smokers, and people with lower income. Given that West Virginia’s
population is older and lower income compared to the national average, this finding is consistent with
Goel and Nelson’s (2012) finding of a lower overall responsiveness in West Virginia.
CROSS BORDER SHOPPING EFFECTS While Goel and Nelson (2012) focus on overall cigarette purchases,
some studies focus on cross-border shopping specifically. In general, the overall change in cigarette
purchasing in a state that follows a tax rate change results from the combination of two separate
effects: First, consumption may actually fall in response to higher prices. Second, individuals may travel
to lower-tax jurisdictions to purchase cigarettes, thereby reducing purchases in the home state but not
reducing overall consumption. In many cases, measuring the two effects separately can be difficult since
data generally do not distinguish whether the cigarettes purchased by an out-of-state consumer.
However, a few studies do focus on cross-border shopping specifically and find generally that cross
border shopping accounts for a large share of the overall purchasing response.5
Given the importance of cross-border shopping, we consider LaFaive and Nesbit (2014)6, who estimate
what share of all cigarettes sold in a state are being consumed in that state in 2013. Their cigarette
smuggling rate is positive if the state experiences a net inflow, where the amount of cigarettes smuggled
into the state is larger than those smuggled outside of the state. For instance, according to the report,
New York has the highest cigarette smuggling rate of 58 percent, indicating that 58 percent of the
cigarettes smoked in New York came from outside of the state.
West Virginia is estimated to have a negative cigarette smuggling rate. In particular, West Virginia’s
cigarette smuggling rate in 2013 was -19.5 percent, meaning that on net, nearly 20 percent of cigarettes
sold in West Virginia during 2013 were purchased by consumers from outside of the state. In other
words, on balance, the state “imports” tobacco tax revenue, largely as a result of possessing a lower
cigarette tax rate compared to three of the five bordering states. Further, this report indicates the rate
of cigarette tax importation has more than doubled from 2006 estimates (-8.4%), at least due in part to
the recent cigarette excise tax increase in Maryland.
These findings imply that West Virginia would actually observe an above-average responsiveness to an
increase in the cigarette excise tax rate since it receives a larger-than-normal share of cross-border
shopping coming into the state. This result runs in contrast to our earlier discussion. It should be noted
that the LaFaive and Nesbit study does carry with it considerable uncertainly, particularly with respect to
the data set used to create these estimates.
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LOCAL CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX POLICY Most counties and cities in the US are prohibited by their
respective states’ laws to have localized cigarette tax rates. In other words they are required to apply
the same cigarette tax rates as the rates imposed by the state government. However, more than 600
local jurisdictions in the US apply their own cigarette excise tax rates in addition to their state rate. The
reasons for why they are allowed to do so may vary, but they appear to stem from a similar
characteristic. Most of them are highly populated cities such as San Francisco, New York City, and
Philadelphia. These local rates vary widely and can be as low as one-fifth the state rate in San Francisco,
or as high as nearly four times the state rate in Alexandria, Virginia.
Local jurisdictions in the state of Arkansas are also allowed to apply cigarette excise tax rates that differ
from the state rate. However, what makes Arkansas unique is that local rates are determined based
upon the rates in the neighboring states and are not simply additions to the state rate – termed “border
zone policy.” In 2009 the state of Arkansas increased the standard state cigarette tax rate from 59 cent
to $1.15 per pack. The 2009 law states that:
“whenever there are two adjoining towns separated by the state line, the cigarette tax in the
Arkansas town is required to be equal to the cigarette tax in the adjoining town outside of
Arkansas plus 3 cents, as long as the resulting tax rate is not greater than Arkansas's standard
tax rate.”
The main reason for imposing such a policy is because the new rate of $1.15 per pack would put
Arkansas’ rate considerably higher than the rates in most neighboring states, except Texas. That would
give the incentives for Arkansas residents in border counties to buy cigarettes in towns located in
neighboring states. By setting the local rates comparable to the rates of neighboring states, they expect
they would lessen the incentive for cross-border shopping.
In theory, the border zone cigarette tax policy should help the state maximize its potential revenue gain.
However, this policy also has several drawbacks that should be considered. First, it makes the rates in
those affected local jurisdictions dependent on the rates in the neighboring states. In other words, those
local jurisdictions have no control over when the rates will change and by how much will the rates
increase. Second, the policy carries with it a relatively high administrative cost given added complexity.
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3. Revenue Estimate of a Cigarette Excise Tax Rate Increase in West Virginia
In this section we estimate the change in cigarette excise tax collections in West Virginia that would
result from a $1 per pack increase in the state’s cigarette excise tax rate. To begin, we provide a casual
examination of patterns observed across the entire US from 2000 through 2014. Over these years we
examine 79 cigarette tax increase episodes, ignoring a few instances where the hikes were 5 cents or
lower. In instances in which increases were phased-in over multiple years, we consider the entire
sequence of events as one episode rather than each step in the phase-in individually.
In Figure 4 we report the 79 cigarette excise tax rate increase episodes that we consider. Markers
represent each tax rate increase, which range from $0.05 to $1.60, along with the decrease in cigarette
purchases between the year before and the year after the episode. As illustrated, a significant amount
of variation exists in the raw data, as decreases in purchases range from basically zero up to nearly 34
percent. Seventeen of the 79 episodes depicted involve decreases in cigarette purchases of less than 10
percent. West Virginia’s $0.38 cigarette excise tax rate increase in 2003 is highlighted in gold. During
that episode West Virginia experienced an 8.1 percent drop in cigarette purchases between 2002 and
2004 while cigarette excise tax revenue increased by approximately $67 million. However, at this time
Ohio and Pennsylvania also increased their cigarette excise tax rates by more than the increase in West
Virginia, which may have encouraged some cross-border shopping into West Virginia.

Figure 4: Observed Changes in Cigarette Purchases Nationwide, 2000-2014, Select Cigarette
Excise Tax Rate Increases

The casual examination depicted in Figure 4 is useful in providing a general sense of the magnitude of
cigarette excise changes observed in the US over the past decade or so along with the associated
purchase decreases. However, this simple examination is imprecise. In particular, the cigarette
8

purchases depicted in the figure almost certainly exaggerate the drop in cigarette purchases that is
caused by increases in cigarette tax rates for two reasons. First, this analysis does not account for the
overall downward trend in smoking nationwide that is not directly related to cigarette excise tax
increases and, second, it also does not explicitly control for the federal cigarette excise tax rate.
As such, we estimate a series of regression models to more carefully estimate the degree to which
increases in cigarette excise tax rates lead to decreases in cigarette purchases in a fashion similar to that
in the literature discussed above. We examine data from all 48 contiguous US states. Because we
believe that the responsiveness of cigarette purchasing behavior to tax policy has increased over time,
as discussed in Goel and Nelson (2012), we only consider data from the years 2000 through 2014.
Overall, this approach results in 672 observations. Our general econometric approach is similar to Goel
and Nelson. Our approach is careful to separate the long-run downward trends in cigarette consumption
as well as federal tax policy from effects associated with state tax policy.
Overall, our results indicate that a $1 per pack increase in the state cigarette excise tax rate results in a
drop of approximately 14 percent. The result is highly statistically significant and robust across several
specifications. To couch our results within the context of the literature above, our results translate into
an elasticity of approximately -0.7, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the per pack cigarette price
results in a 7 percent drop in cigarette purchases.
In Figure 5 we apply our results to the question of various increases in the cigarette excise tax rate, for a
range of 45 cents up to $1 per pack. Larger tax hike scenarios were not considered in the context of this
study. Only five of the previous 79 tax rate increases since 2000 have involved hikes in excess of $1.01
per pack and the rate of decline in cigarette purchases during each of these tax increases occurred along
a fairly large range. As a result, any estimated gains in excise tax revenue stemming from an increase of
$1.25 or $1.50 per pack would be subject to a great deal of uncertainty.
Our results are based off the 2015 fiscal year, during which the state generated just above $95 million in
cigarette excise tax revenue from nearly 173 million packs sold. For illustrative purposes, we begin with
an elasticity of zero, which indicates that cigarette purchases do not change after any of the selected tax
increases. In this simplistic (and extremely unlikely) scenario, the state would collect additional cigarette
excise tax revenue of $78, $130 and $173 million, respectively. This can be obtained by simply
multiplying the level of purchases by the absolute change in the tax rate.
We anticipate the most likely scenario will likely come from an elasticity estimate of -0.7, which is based
on our regression analysis and is consistent with the literature discussed above. In this setting, we
estimate a tax rate increase of 45 cents per pack will likely lead to over a 6 percent drop in cigarette
purchases and yield approximately $67 million in additional excise tax collections. Using a rate increase
of $1 per pack, we project a 14 percent loss in cigarette purchases and a net increase of $134 million in
excise tax revenue. For the purposes of comparison, a 75 cents per pack tax rate hike is expected to
cause an 11 percent fall in purchases, but an additional $105 million in excise tax collections.
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Figure 5. Estimated Effect of Selected Increases in WV Cigarette Excise Tax Rate, FY 2015
Excise Tax
Increase (cents
per pack)
45

75

100

Possible
Behavioral
Elasticity
0.0
-0.7
-1.3
0.0
-0.7
-1.3
0.0
-0.7
-1.3

Cigarette Packs
Change in
Cigarette Excise Change in Cigarette
Net Change in
Purchased
Cigarette Packs Tax Revenue ($, Excise Tax Revenue Revenue, Includes
(millions)
Purchased (%)
millions)
($, millions)
Sales Tax ($, millions)
173
0
173
78
82
162
-6
162
67
69
152
-12
152
57
60
173
0
225
130
134
154
-11
201
105
107
138
-20
180
85
86
173
0
268
173
183
148
-14
229
134
135
127
-27
196
101
101

Notes: Actual FY2015 consumption is 172.9 million packs, generating $95.1 million in cigarette excise tax

Outcomes for an elasticity estimate of -1.3 are also reported in Figure 5. An elasticity estimate of this
magnitude lies well outside the range found in most of the academic literature and is significantly larger
than our preferred estimate. Nonetheless, in this scenario which should generally be regarded as a
lower bound, we estimate declines of 12, 20 and 27 percent for the three hypothetical tax rate hikes
that would create additional excise tax revenue of $57, $85 and $101 million, respectively.
Finally, after accounting for the incremental change in sales tax revenue that would occur due to fewer
cigarette packs being purchased at a higher retail price, the overall net change in revenue for each
hypothetical tax rate increase would equal roughly $69, $107 and $135 million, respectively, under the
scenario of a -0.7 elasticity estimate. This result indicates gains in consumer sales tax revenue begin to
evaporate as the excise tax rate increases and will eventually contract once the excise tax rate exceeds a
specific level.
PHASE-IN OPTION Rather than raise the cigarette tax rate per pack by $1.00 at a single point in time,
any hypothetical tax rate hike could take place over a period of two to four years. Phasing in the rate
hike over time could mitigate the potential for revenue losses in the transition year from a lower rate to
a higher rate, since consumers in West Virginia (and those in neighboring states with demonstrably
higher tobacco taxes relative to WV) would have less incentive to “stockpile” by buying larger-thannormal quantities of cigarettes ahead of the rate change. Unfortunately, we lack the data needed to
reliably estimate and fully evaluate the short-term impacts on purchases that would follow a phase-in of
the selected increases discussed earlier in the report.
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4. State Taxation of Electronic Cigarettes
POLICIES IN OTHER STATES As of late-2015, only three states and the District of Columbia levy an excise
tax on electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) or the nicotine-containing liquid used to fill the devices.
Minnesota currently applies the most aggressive excise tax, levying a rate of 95 percent of the wholesale
price, equal to its excise tax on cigarettes and OTPs. This tax rate applies only to single-use e-cigarettes
and cartridges containing nicotine for re-usable/re-fillable devices and components.
Two of the other states that authorize e-cigarette taxation, as well as Kansas (which will begin taxing the
products by July 2016), apply the tax to the consumable nicotine liquid solution on a per milliliter basis.
Kansas will tax the liquid solution for e-cigarettes at a rate of 20 cents per mL, or the equivalent of more
than a 40 percent tax rate for a 15-mL bottle with a wholesale price of $6.95. Of interest here is that
nicotine liquid products have varying concentrations of nicotine, so taxing on a per mL basis could
incentivize consumers to buy bottles containing higher levels of nicotine.
LIMITED DATA AVAILABILITY Several issues create difficulty in formulating tax policy for e-cigarette
products. First, data on sales volume and price are limited due to the fact that the marketplace is
fractured. In addition to traditional retail channels, a significant share of e-cigarettes and their products
are sold online and at specialty shops. Without adequate data on pricing and sales, estimating changes
in consumer behavior stemming from tax policy changes would make any resulting revenue forecasts
less reliable compared to forecasts for more longstanding items.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS ON TAX-INDUCED BEHAVIORAL CHANGES Relatively few studies have examined
the sensitivity of e-cigarette demand to price changes. The few studies that have been conducted point
to higher levels of price sensitivity for disposable and re-usable e-cigarettes when compared to
traditional cigarettes. Huang et al (2014)7 estimate an own-price elasticity of -1.2 for disposables and 1.9 for re-usable e-cigarettes, indicating a 10 percent price increase will result in 12 percent and 19
percent respective declines in demand for each product. Recall that this compares to our estimated
elasticity of -0.7 for traditional cigarettes, as discussed above. Huang et al. also note some
substitutability between the two products as their estimates indicate that a 10 percent increase in reusable e-cigarette prices yields a 5 percent increase in demand for disposables. Finally, the study was
inconclusive with respect to the impact of cigarette taxes and prices on e-cigarette demand, but the
authors suggest higher cigarette prices and taxes would lead to more experimentation and/or adoption
of e-cigarettes by traditional cigarette smokers.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS Policymakers should evaluate which e-cigarette products should be taxed and
whether tax rates that are applied to regular cigarettes and/or OTPs should also be used for ecigarettes. Since disposable and re-usable e-cigarettes are substitutes for one another, tax rates should
be applied appropriately to the disposable e-cigarettes and the nicotine refills for re-usable devices so as
to keep relative prices of the products aligned. In addition, data from the CDC8 suggest that current
smokers or smokers who quit (or attempted to quit) within the past year comprise the wide majority of
e-cigarette users. Consequently, tax rates for e-cigarettes that are either too high or too low relative to
7

Huang J, et al. 2014. “The Impact of Price and Tobacco Control Policies on the Demand for Electronic Nicotine Delivery
Systems,” Tobacco Control, 23: 41-47.
8 Schoenborn, Charlotte A. and Renee Gindi (2015). “Electronic Cigarette Use Among Adults: United States, 2014,” NCHS Data
Brief, 217. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db217.htm

11

traditional cigarettes could significantly affect revenue collections for e-cigarettes and to a lesser extent
tobacco cigarettes. With that in mind, it would be wise to begin taxing e-cigarette products at a
relatively low rate, such as 3-5¢/mL, and subsequently examine the impacts on demand in the future.
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5. Excise Taxation on Other Tobacco Products
POLICIES ACROSS STATES West Virginia was among the last states to begin applying excise taxes to
other tobacco products (OTP), such as snuff and chewing tobacco, in 2002. Taxes were set at the same
rates for all other tobacco products at 7 percent of the wholesale price. For comparison, these rates are
in most cases lower than the neighboring states. For instance, Kentucky has a 19 cent tax per unit of dry
snuff, while Maryland and Ohio have a 15 and 17 percent tax on the wholesale price, respectively, and
Virginia has a tax of 10 percent of the manufacturer’s price. For chewing and smoking tobacco,
Kentucky, Maryland, and Ohio have a 15 percent, 15 percent, and 17 percent tax of the wholesale price,
respectively, while Virginia has a 10 percent tax on the manufacturer’s price.
The majority of states nationwide utilize a manufacturer or wholesale-based pricing system and
generally considered the easiest to administer and most likely to minimize the potential for revenue
losses that could occur under a weight-based system. For example, a weight-based tax system for OTP
would put a lower per-pack or per-dose tax on many of the new lower-weight products available today
such as snus and pouches. A tax levied on standardized sizing of OTP products, combined with an
additional minimum tax levied on smaller (or higher-dosed) OTPs could also be used. However, this
would likely present new complexities into administration due to the need in determining what
constitutes a standard size as well as burden on the collection of taxes by businesses.

Chewing &
Smoking
Tobacco Tax

State

Snuff Tax

DC

67%
wholesale
price

Kentucky

19¢/unit

Maryland

30%
wholesale
price

30%
wholesale
price

Ohio

17%
wholesale
price

17%
wholesale
price

None

None

Pennsylvania

Virginia

West Virginia

18¢/oz.
7% wholesale
price

67%
wholesale
price
15%
wholesale
price

Cigar Tax

-

2015

250

2009

60

2012

200

-

1993

160

(the same rate
as cigarette
tax)

2009

160

10% mfr. price

2011

30

7% wholesale
price

2002

55

15%
wholesale
price
Non-premium:
70% w/s price;
Premium: 15%
w/s price

Chewing: 21¢70¢/unit
Other: 10%
mfr. price
7% wholesale
price
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Date OTP tax Cigarette Tax
last changed
(¢/pack)

OTP REVENUE IN WEST VIRGINIA Since 2002 the tax revenues collected from OTP sales in West Virginia
have increased steadily from $2.2 million in 2002 to $7.1 million in 2015. This means OTP consumption is
estimated to have increased from 31.7 million units to 100.9 million units during the same period. While
this data is useful, it does not provide enough information about how the continued increase in the OTP
consumption relates to shifts in cigarette usage during the same period.
EXISTING RESEARCH ON TAX POLICY AND OTP While there is a vast literature on the economic
consequences of cigarette consumption, the same cannot be said for the consumption of OTP.
Literature has done very little to examine the economic relationship between cigarette and OTP
consumption. Gwarnicki et al. (2014)9, for instance, examined the cross price elasticity of OTP
consumption with respect to cigarette prices but was unable to produce consistent estimates.
HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS The majority of the literature on OTP available focuses more on the health
consequences rather than the economic issues related to OTP consumption. Nonetheless, many of these
studies have noted cigarette and OTP consumption are inter-related and changes in the relative prices
of these products through taxes, as well as other tobacco control methods, can affect demand. For
instance, Tomar et al. (2009)10 finds cigarette smokers have a higher likelihood than non-smokers to also
consume OTP. In addition, this article finds that dual users of cigarette and OTP are more prevalent
among young smokers than adult smokers. Bombard et al. (2008)11, who use data from the 2002 and
2004 National Youth Tobacco Surveys, find that 62 percent of male young smokers also use OTP,
compared to 31 percent of female young smokers.
SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN CIGARETTES AND OTP Despite the fact that we do not have specific findings
on the economic interaction between OTP and cigarettes, the fact that a significant number of cigarette
smokers consume OTP simultaneously suggests that substituting OTP for cigarettes is something that
some smokers sometimes do. If cigarette prices increase, we would expect to see some smokers reduce
their cigarette consumption as they switch to consuming the relatively less expensive OTP.
PROPOSED OTP STRATEGY With the hypothetical $1 per pack cigarette tax increase and the lower tax
rate currently levied on OTP, West Virginia should equalize tax rates for OTP relative to cigarettes. This
would limit revenue losses that would occur under an unequal tax treatment. Specifically, as prices for
cigarettes rise further relative to OTP, unequal tax treatment would encourage further substitution to
these products primarily for dual-users, but could also incentivize some smokers to switch to these
products.
The current parallel tax rate (based on wholesale price) for cigarettes is approximately 14 percent, or
twice that of OTP. After raising the cigarette tax rate to $1.55 per pack, this would push the parallel rate
for cigarettes to 39 percent of the average wholesale price. Consequently, equalizing the tax rates for
OTP to cigarettes would push the wholesale tax rate for OTP up from 7 percent to 39 percent. Rather
than equalizing rates outright, an alternative choice could be to raise OTP tax rates in a manner where
the increase is proportional to that of the hike levied on cigarettes. In this case, the wholesale tax rate
would be increased from 7 to 20 percent.
9

Gwarnicki, Cezary T., Jidong Huang, Frank J. Chaloupka, “A Comprehensive Examination of Price Elasticities of Tobacco
Products: Evidence from Commercial Store Scanner Data,” Tobacconomics, 2014.
10 Scott L Tomar, Hillel R Alpert, Gregory N Connolly, “Patterns of dual use of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco among US males: findings from national surveys,” Tobacco Control, 2010, v 19: 104-109.
11 Bombard JM, Rock VJ, Pederson LL, Asman KJ., “Monitoring polytobacco use among adolescents: Do cigarette smokers use
other forms of tobacco?” Nicotine Tobacco Resources, Nov 2008, 10(11): 1581-9.
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ESTIMATED REVENUE GROWTH Due to limited data availability for state-level consumption and
wholesale prices for the various types of OTP, inconsistent estimates for OTP price elasticities in other
research studies, as well as the differing tax structures that states apply to OTP (i.e. weight-based, unitbased or ad valorem), we do not conduct a regression-based analysis of the marginal revenue gains that
would be expected in West Virginia. Instead, we examine seven OTP tax rate hikes from the past decade
for states that assess ad valorem taxes as a share of the wholesale or manufacturer’s price. Four states
increased their OTP tax rates by an average of 12 percentage points while the other three increased
rates by an average of 27 percentage points.
Among the 7 specific states instituting the smallest percentage point increases in OTP tax rates, the
amount of revenue collected was (on average) nearly proportional to the relative magnitude of the tax
increase, i.e. a doubling of the tax rate yielded a roughly 90 percent increase in revenue. By comparison,
those states raising OTP tax rates the most in absolute terms saw a doubling of the rate produce a
revenue gain of approximately 80 percent.
Based upon these basic calculations, we estimate the additional OTP revenue the state of West Virginia
could expect to collect for three new hypothetical tax rates: 12, 20 and 39 percent. Raising the OTP tax
rate from 7 to 12 percent would yield an estimated $4.7 million increase in excise revenue to the state
relative to fiscal year 2015. By contrast, an increase from 7 to 20 percent could be expected to boost
OTP tax revenue by approximately $11.1 million, while raising the OTP wholesale tax rate to 39 percent,
which would equalize rates with the hypothetical $1 per pack increase for cigarettes, would yield $24.4
million in additional revenue.
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About the Bureau of Business and Economic Research
Since the 1940s, the BBER’s mission has been to serve the people of West Virginia by providing the
state’s business and policymaking communities with reliable data and rigorous applied economic
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